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Abstract—Eavesdropping attacks in inference systems aim to
learn not the raw data, but the system inferences to predict
and manipulate system actions. We argue that conventional
information security measures can be ambiguous on the adver-
sary’s estimation abilities, and adopt instead a distortion based
framework that enables to operate over a metric space. We
show that requiring perfect distortion-based security is more
frugal than requiring perfect information-theoretic secrecy even
for block length one codes, offering in some cases unbounded
gains. Within this framework, we design algorithms that enable
to efficiently use shared randomness, and show that each bit of
shared random key is exponentially useful in security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The operation of Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), such as
transportation systems and the electrical grid, increasingly
relies on networked data collection and inference systems.
Such systems distributively collect and compute functions of
data for control decisions. Adversarial attacks in such systems
aim to learn not the raw data but the system inferences
to predict and manipulate the system actions. Most of the
established security theory is tailored on protecting data; in
contrast, in this paper, we discuss how to protect inference
processes and decisions.
Our first observation is that information security measures
(such as the conventional equivocation rate) can be ambiguous
on how much an eavesdropper has learned about a CPS
system operation. Assume that a control function takes values
uniformly at random in {1, 2, . . . , 20}, and the associated
action is proportional to the function value. The entropy of
this function is log(20). Now consider two cases. For case
I, at the end of a transmission, the eavesdropper knows that
the function value is in {1, 2}, each with probability 1/2.
For case II, the eavesdropper knows that the function value
is in {1, 20}, each with probability 1/2. Both cases have an
equivocation rate of 1 (i.e. the entropy of the function given
the information the eavesdropper has, is 1). But in the first
case, the two possibilities are much closer than the second
case, so the eavesdropper can predict the system action with
high precision. Similarly, if an eavesdropper knows that the
function value is uniformly at random in {1, 20}, this would
still be less useful for the eavesdropper than knowing it is in
{1, 2, 3, 4}, although the equivocation rate is lower.
In this paper, we use instead a distortion measure for
security that aims to maximize the square error difference
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between the eavesdropper’s estimate and the true value of a
function. Squared error distortion is a widely accepted metric
in estimation and control, and can capture how much an
adversary has learned about core attributes of a CPS system,
such as the system state.
Moreover, while for perfect information theoretic secu-
rity we require shared keys of size equal to the message
entropy, requiring perfect distortion-based security is much
more frugal. For example, if we again take the example of
a control function taking values uniformly at random from
{1, 2, . . . , 20}, we show in Theorem 6 that only one bit of
shared key is sufficient to guarantee perfect distortion based
security, as opposed to the log(20) bits of shared keys for
information theoretic security. We obtain this result using a
scalar coding scheme of block length one.
We design schemes to achieve distortion based security. Our
main contributions are:
• We show that for a single source, each additional bit of
shared key is exponentially useful in distortion based security.
• We design a polynomial time algorithm and show it is
optimal for regularly spaced function values.
• We prove that for multiple distributed sources and separable
functions it suffices to protect each individual source sepa-
rately, and is also necessary for sum and product functions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
the problem formulation; Section III summarizes our results;
Proofs for these results are outlined in Sections IV and V.
A. Related Work
While information theoretic security has been extensively
studied, most notably by Shannon [1] and Wyner [2], study of
distortion based security was started by Yamamoto [3], where
the goal is to maximize the distortion of an eavesdropper’s
estimate on a message. Schieler and Cuff [4] later showed that,
in the limit of an infinite block length (n) code, only log(n)
bit of secret keys are needed to achieve the maximum possible
distortion. However, Schieler and Cuff also showed that such
secrecy is rather fragile, as causal disclosure of even a single
message symbol can compromise the secrecy of the entire
block. This issue was because the coding scheme involves
infinite block length. In this paper, we take block length equal
to one, which obviates the need to wait and accumulate data at
the sensor. It also removes the fragility of the distortion based
measure as now we do not need to code a sequence of symbols
jointly, and can rather code each symbol independently with a
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Fig. 1: The sources are connected to the receiver through
noiseless channels. The receiver computes f(X1, . . . , Xn).
new key. We find that for the block length one codes, while a
regularly spaced alphabet can be secured easily with only one
bit of shared secret key, the problem becomes combinatorially
hard for irregularly spaced alphabets. We also note that, unlike
information theoretic security, distortion security of alphabet
A, does not imply distortion security of alphabet B which
is a one-to-one mapping of A. A different notion of secure
estimation is studied by Wiese et. al. in [5] where they
considered zero-error secret capacity. Semantic security has
also been used for function protection, and can be posed
in two different versions: (i) in an information theoretical
setting, which has been shown to be equivalent to “strong”
information-theoretic security [6], [7] - and thus does not
enable operation with smaller amounts of key than traditional
strong information-theoretic security; (ii) in a computational
setting, not related to the framework of this paper as we
do not make computational assumptions on the power of the
adversary.
II. SETUP
Our system consists of n sources S1, S2, . . . , Sn connected
through noiseless links to a common receiver as shown in
Fig. 1. An eavesdropper, Eve, observes all the n links. Each
source produces a symbol Xi drawn with a distribution Pi
from a discrete alphabet1 set Xi of sizemi. We assume that the
symbols generated at the n sources are mutually independent.
The receiver wants to compute a function f (with co-domain
R) of source symbols X := [X1, X2, . . . , Xn], such that the
receiver’s computation has no error and Eve’s estimate is
“maximally distorted” with respect to the function f . Each
source is also given a secret key of size ki bits shared with
only the receiver and not with the eavesdropper; equivalently a
symbol (Ki) uniformly drawn from {1, 2, . . . , 2
ki}. We denote
the symbol transmitted by source Si as g(Xi,Ki) and shorten
it as g(Xi) for brevity. With g(X, k) (and shorten it as g(X)),
we denote set of symbols transmitted from all the sources i.e.,
{g(Xi) : i ∈ [n]}, where [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}. The distortion
of Eve’s estimate for k := [k1, k2, . . . , kn] bits of keys is:
Dach(k) = min
fˆ
EX,k[(f(X)− fˆ(g(X, k)))
2], (1)
where fˆ is the Eve’s strategy to estimate f from her obser-
vation g(X, k). If Eve has no information, her distortion is
1For many systems, measurements are over reals, and we discretize by
quantization at each source.
the maximum distortion and is denoted as Dmax. In this case,
Eve’s best estimate is E[f ] and the corresponding distortion is
Dmax = var(f(X)). (2)
We are interested in the following two problems.
• For a given function f , what is the minimum amount of
shared keys required so that Dach(k) is equal to Dmax.
• For a given function f and amount of keys k, what distortion
Dach(k) an optimal encoding scheme achieves.
III. MAIN RESULTS
The following two theorems summarize our main results.
The first one deals with single-source computation, and the
second one deals with multi-source computation, both under
the assumption of uniform source alphabet. Proofs are outlined
in sections IV and V, respectively.
Theorem 1. Suppose there is a single source modeled as a
random variable X connected to the receiver through a noise-
less channel, and the receiver wishes to compute a function
Y = f(X) with perfect accuracy. Assume k bits of secret
key are shared between the transmitter and the receiver. If Y
is uniformly distributed on some alphabet Y ⊆ R, |Y| = m,
then the difference between the maximum distortion of Y when
no information is available and the eavesdropper’s achievable
distortion can be upper bounded by2
∆ = Dmax −Dach(k) ≤
Dmax
2k
. (3)
Furthermore, if d = max
yi,yj∈Y
(yi − yj), then
∆ = Dmax −Dach(k) ≤
d2
22k
. (4)
Theorem 1 implies that each bit of the shared key exponen-
tially increases the eavesdropper’s distortion toward Dmax.
In particular, with just 5 bits of shared key we can achieve
a distortion close to 97% of Dmax. In contrast, for perfect
information theoretic secrecy, we require log(m) bits of key.
The proof of Theorem 1 is constructive. Depending on the
key value i, the source uses a different mapping σi to create
the symbols to transmit. Algorithms 1 and 2 describe how
to create the mappings to achieve (3) and (4), respectively.
Alg. 1 has polynomial-time complexity, is optimal for k = 1,
and achieves perfect secrecy when Y is “regularly spaced”
(see Section IV).
Theorem 2. If f(X) =
L∑
ℓ=1
n∏
i=1
f
(ℓ)
i (Xi), where f
(ℓ)
i (Xi) is an
arbitrary function for all i ∈ [n], ℓ ∈ [L] then it is sufficient
to secure each individual f
(ℓ)
i (Xi). Furthermore, if
1)f(X) =
n∑
i=1
fi(Xi), or
2)f(X) =
n∏
i=1
fi(Xi) and
n∏
i=1
E[fi(Xi)].var[fi(Xi)] 6= 0,
2Results do not depend on the value m takes and are true ∀m ∈ N.
it is also necessary to secure the individual functions fi(Xi).
Theorem 2 states that to protect a function that can be
written as a sum of product separable functions, it suffices to
protect each individual component separately. This includes a
fairly wide class of functions that can be protected. Theorem 2
also shows that such a scheme is optimal when we wish to
compute sum and product under our setting.
As an example, suppose there are n source symbols
X1, X2, . . . , Xn all i.i.d. on [m]. If the function to compute
is
∑n
i=1Xi, then we can protect each Xi individually with
1 bit of key, and thus n bits of key would achieve perfect
distortion based secrecy. It can be shown that n log(m) bits
will be necessary to information-theoretically secure the sum
function.
Algorithm 1
WLOG assume y1 ≥ y2 ≥ . . . ≥ ym. We use r = m and
select permutations σi on [m] for i ∈ [2
k]. The source
uses the mapping σi if the shared key K value is i.
Select Permutations:
1: σ1(j) = j, ∀j ∈ [m] (σ1 is the identity permutation)
2: for 2 ≤ i ≤ 2k do (determine each σi at step i)
3: Sˆj ←
i−1∑
ℓ=1
yσℓ(j), ∀j ∈ [m]
4: Arrange Sˆj in increasing order. Let κ1, κ2, . . . , κm
be the corresponding indices, namely Sˆκ1 ≤ Sˆκ2 ≤
. . . ≤ ˆSκn then j gets permuted to κ
th
j position. That
is, σi(κj) = j, ∀j ∈ [m].
Algorithm 2
1: Make 2k copies of the alphabet Y = {y1, y2, . . . , ym}.
WLOG assume y1 ≥ y2 ≥ . . . ≥ ym.
2: Randomly divide the 2k copies of Y into r bins such that
each bin has less than or equal to 2k elements. Here, each
bin will correspond to a symbol the y’s got mapped to.
3: Si ←
∑
y∈bin i y
4: whilemax (Si)−min(Sj) > y1−ym, exchange the largest
element in bin i with smallest element in bin j.
IV. PROOFS FOR SINGLE SOURCE
We here consider a single source S, a message X drawn
from a discrete alphabet X , and a receiver who wants to
compute a function Y = f(X) that takes m values (without
loss of generality, assume that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ . . . ≥ ym). The
source and receiver use k shared secret bits to protect Y .
Depending on the value K = i the key bits take, the source
uses a different mapping σi that maps each yj value to one of
r transmission symbols τj . We can depict all the σi mappings
together with a bipartite graph as in Fig. 2 (we allow parallel
edges), where we think of every τj as a bin. We denote the
number of y-symbols mapped into this bin as Nj and the sum
of all these symbols by Sj , where j ∈ [r]. We refer to Sj as
the jth bin value.
Y
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Fig. 2: (a) Each of the 2k mappings corresponds to m edges
in the bipartite graph; the key value determines which one to
use. (b) Example of mappings created with Algorithm 1.
For example, the two mappings in Fig. 2(b), depicted with
solid and dotted lines, are created using Algorithm 1: we have
four message symbols (m = 4), four bins (r = 4), each bin
has two elements (Nj = 2, ∀j) and bin value five (Sj = 5, ∀j).
We prove the first bound in Theorem 1 by showing that
the mappings created by Algorithm 1 achieve at least the
distortion in (3). Lemma 3 shows that maximizing distortion is
equivalent to minimizing the sum of the bin values Sj . Given
that
∑r
j=1 Sj=2
k
∑n
j=1 yj=constant, the minimum is achieved
when all the bin values are equal. Alg. 1 tries to achieve this for
the case where r = m with a greedy approach that sequentially
designs each of the mappings σi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 2
k: at step i, it
calculates the partial bin values Sˆj that sum y-values allocated
in the previous i−1 mappings; for the σi mapping, it allocates
the smaller symbol values to the bins that have accummulated
the larger Sˆj values so as to smooth out differences.
Lemma 3.
∆ = Dmax −Dach(k)
=
m∑
j=1
1
p(τj)
(
m∑
i=1
yip(τj |yi)p(yi)
)2
−E[Y ]2.
In addition, if the source alphabet is uniformly distributed,
then the expression simplifies to
∆ = Dmax −Dach(k) =
1
2km
r∑
j=1
S2j
Nj
− E[Y ]2.
where Sj is the sum of all symbols (not necessarily distinct)
mapped to τj .
Proof. If Eve observes a symbol τ , then her best estimate
is E
[
Y
∣∣τ], with distortion Dach = E [var(Y )∣∣τ]. Thus
∆ = var(Y )− E
[
var(Y ))
∣∣τ] = var (E [Y |τ ])
=
r∑
j=1
p(τj)
(
m∑
i=1
yip(yi|τj)
)2
− E [Y ]
2
=r∑
j=1
1
p(τj)
(
m∑
i=1
yip(τj |yi)p(yi)
)2
− E [Y ]
2
.
For uniform Y , let nij be the number of keys for which yi
is mapped to τj . Thus the difference becomes
∆ =
r∑
j=1
1
p(τj)
(
m∑
i=1
yip(τj |yi)p(yi)
)2
− E [Y ]
2
=
r∑
j=1
1
Nj/ (2km)
(
m∑
i=1
yi
(nij
2k
)( 1
m
))2
− E [Y ]
2
=
1
2km
r∑
j=1
1
Nj
(
m∑
i=1
yinij
)2
− E [Y ]2
=
1
2km
r∑
j=1
1
Nj
(Sj)
2
− E [Y ]
2
.
Proof of (3) in Theorem 1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k, we use the σi
from Alg. 1, and map {yσi(j) : i ∈ [2
k]} for j ∈ [m] to bin j.
Using Lemma 3,
∆ = Dmax −Dach(k) =
1
2km
r∑
j=1
S2j
Nj
− E[Y ]2
(i)
=
1
22km
m∑
j=1

 2k∑
i=1
yσi(j)


2
− E[Y ]2
=
1
22km

2k∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
y2σi(j)+2
2k∑
ℓ=2
m∑
j=1
yσℓ(j)
ℓ−1∑
i=1
yσi(j)

−E[Y ]2
(ii)
≤
1
22km
2k
m∑
j=1
y2j
+
2
22km
2k∑
ℓ=2
m


m∑
j=1
yj
m




m∑
j=1
ℓ−1∑
i=1
yσi(j)
m

 − E[Y ]2
=
1
2k
E[Y 2] +
2
22km
2k∑
ℓ=2
mE[Y ](ℓ − 1)E[Y ]− E[Y ]2
=
1
2k
E[Y 2] +
2E[Y ]2
22k
(2k − 1)2k
2
− E[Y ]2
=
1
2k
E[Y 2]−
1
2k
E[Y ]2 =
1
2k
var(Y ) =
1
2k
Dmax.
Here (i) follows by putting Nj = 2
k and (ii) follows from
Chebyshev’s sum inequality [8] as yσℓ(j) and
ℓ−1∑
i=1
yσi(j) are in
opposing order due to the construction in Alg. 1.
To prove the second bound in Theorem 1, we use Alg. 2 to
design the σi’s; Lemma 4 bounds the resulting Sj values.
Lemma 4. Let d = max (yi) − min (yj), then at the end of
Alg. 2, E[Y ]2k m
r
− d ≤ Si ≤ E[Y ]2
k m
r
+ d, ∀i ∈ [r].
Proof. Suppose the contrary that there is some i such that
Si > E[Y ]2
k m
r
+ d. By the pigeonhole principle, there is also
some j so that Sj < E[Y ]2
k m
r
. But then Sj − Si > d, which
contradicts the terminating condition of the algorithm. Similar
reasoning holds for the case where there is some i such that
Si < E[Y ]2
k m
r
− d.
Proof for (4) in Theorem 1. We first note that, in each step
of Alg. 2, max (Si)−min(Sj) is decreasing. Since there are
only finite many possible values for max (Si)−min(Sj), the
algorithm terminates.
Take r = m, so there are 2k elements in each bin, and so
∆ = 1
22km
m∑
i=1
S2i − E[Y ]
2. By Lemma 4, we have E[Y ]2k −
d ≤ Si ≤ E[Y ]2
k + d. We also note that
m∑
i=1
Si = m2
k
E[Y ].
So to bound ∆, we have the following optimization problem:
maximize
m∑
i=1
S2i
subject to
m∑
i=1
Si = m2
k
E[Y ]
E[Y ]2k − d ≤ Si ≤ E[Y ]2
k + d, ∀i ∈ [m].
Then
m∑
i=1
S2i is upper bounded by m(2
2k
E[Y ]2+d2). Thus,
∆ ≤
1
22k
(22kE[Y ]2 + d2)− E[Y ]2 =
d2
22k
.
We next characterize properties of optimal mappings, using
the bipartite graph representation in Fig. 2. The following
lemma bounds the degrees and number of vertices in the graph,
which we use to prove Theorem 6.
Lemma 5. For the mapping in Fig. 2, the following are true.
1) The degree of each yj is 2
k.
2) The degree of each τj is ≤ 2
k. This implies Nj ≤ 2
k.
3) For an optimal mapping, Nj ≤ 2
k−1 for at most one j.
4) For an optimal mapping, m ≤ r < 2m.
Proof. .1) Since the key K can take 2k different values, there
will be one outgoing edge for each value of key.
2) The legitimate receiver needs to decode Y , and a degree
greater than 2k will make it impossible to decode based on
the shared key.
3) Suppose there are two bins having less than or equal to 2k−1
elements, then we can merge them. Eve’s distortion before
merging isD = min
Yˆ=g(τ) E[(Y −Yˆ )
2]. Now, call the random
variable representing the transmitted symbol after merging τ ′.
This gives distortion D = min
Yˆ=g(τ ′) E[(Y − Yˆ )
2]. Since τ ′
is a function of τ , this gives a higher distortion.
4) The net degree of Y is m2k. Similarly, the net degree of τ
is not greater than r2k. By part 1 of the lemma, m2k ≤ r2k .
This implies r ≥ m. Based on the third part of this lemma,
each bin will have more than 2k−1 edges except probably
one. This bounds the total degree (I) of τ as m2k = I ≥
(r − 1)(2k−1 + 1) + 1 > (r − 1)(2k−1). Thus r ≤ 2m.
Theorem 6. The encoding scheme in Alg. 1 is optimal for
k = 1. Moreover, if Y is “regularly spaced” i.e. Y = {y, y+
d, . . . , y + (m − 1)d}, for some y, d ∈ R, d ≤ 0, it achieves
perfect distortion security.
Proof. By Lemma 5, Nj = 2 for each j, so
∆ = Dmax −Dach(k) =
1
22km
m∑
j=1
S2j − E[Y ]
2
=
1
4m
m∑
j=1
S2j −E[Y ]
2 =
1
4m
m∑
j=1
(yσ1(j) + yσ2(j))
2 − E[Y ]2
=
1
2m

 m∑
j=1
y2j +
m∑
j=1
yσ1(j)yσ2(j)

− E[Y ]2.
Without loss of generality, assume that σ1 is the identity
function, then by the Rearrangement Inequality, ∆ is mini-
mized when σ2(j) = m − 1 − j. This is the same σ2(j) we
get from Alg. 1. Now for the regularly spaced Y ,
Sj = yj + ym−j+1 = 2y + (m− 1)d,
E[Y |τj ] =
Sj
2
= y +
(m− 1)
2
d = E[Y ], ∀j ∈ [m].
Thus by Lemma 7, Dach(1) = Dmax.
V. PROOFS FOR MULTIPLE SOURCES
To prove Theorem 2, we repeatedly apply Lemma 7, which
follows from standard results in MMSE estimation [9].
Lemma 7. The function f(X) is perfectly secured under the
Euclidean distortion measure if and only if,
E
[
f(X)
∣∣g(X)] = E [f(X)] , ∀g(X).
Proof of Theorem 2. Sufficient: If f
(ℓ)
i (Xi)’s are secure, then
E
[
f(X)
∣∣g(X)] = E
[
L∑
ℓ=1
n∏
i=1
f
(ℓ)
i (Xi)|g(X)
]
=
L∑
ℓ=1
n∏
i=1
E
[
f
(ℓ)
i (Xi)|g(X)
]
=
L∑
ℓ=1
n∏
i=1
E
[
f
(ℓ)
i (Xi)
]
= E

 L∑
ℓ=1
∏
i∈[n]
f
(ℓ)
i (Xi)

 = E [f(X)] .
Necessary: Suppose not all fi(Xi) are secured. For f(X) =∑n
i=1 fi(Xi), by Lemma 7 we can pick g(Xi) so that
E [fi(Xi)|g(Xi)] 6= E [fi(Xi)] for each unsecured fi(Xi).
Since E [E [fi(Xi)|g(Xi)]] = E[fi(Xi)] we can further assume
without loss of generality that E [fi(Xi)|g(Xi)] > E [fi(Xi)].
With this,
E
[
f(X)
∣∣g(X)] = n∑
i=1
E
[
fi(Xi)
∣∣g(X)]
>
n∑
i=1
E [fi(Xi)] = E [f(X)] .
Thus f(X) =
n∑
i=1
fi(Xi) is not secure.
Similarly for the case f(X) =
∏n
i=1 fi(Xi), for each
unsecured fi(Xi), we pick g(Xi) so that |E [fi(Xi)|g(Xi)]| >
|E [fi(Xi)]|. Then we have∣∣E [f(X)∣∣g(X)] ∣∣ = n∏
i=1
∣∣E [fi(Xi)∣∣g(X)] ∣∣
>
∏
i∈[n]
∣∣E [fi(Xi)] ∣∣ = ∣∣E [f(X)] ∣∣.
Thus f(X) =
∏n
i=1 fi(Xi) is also not secure. It remains to
show it is necessary to transmit each fi(Xi).
Suppose the receiver uses a function h on {g(Xi), i ∈ [n]}
to compute f(X). If f(X) =
n∑
i=1
fi(Xi), then
fi(Xi) = h (g(x1), . . . , g(Xi), . . . , g(xm))−
∑
j 6=i
fj(x).
If f(X) =
∏n
i=1 fi(Xi),
fi(Xi) =
h (g(x1), . . . , g(xi−1), g(Xi), g(xi+1), . . . , g(xn))∏
j 6=i
fj(xj)
,
where we choose xj , such that fj(xj) 6= 0. Thus fi(Xi) are
necessary to communicate with the receiver.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we argued that distortion based security is
important for applications such as CPS, and presented the first
coding schemes that achieve short-block length (single-shot)
distortion security. We found that Eve’s distortion increases
exponentially with the number of bits of shared key, and
proved that our schemes are optimal in some cases. We provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for security for a number
of interesting cases, such as for functions that can be written
as sum or product of functions in individual variables. This
includes various statistical functions like mean and variance.
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